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A B S T R A C T
Successful social relationships require a consideration of a partner's thoughts and intentions. This aspect of social
life is captured in the social mindfulness paradigm (SoMi task), in which participants make decisions that either
limit or preserve options for their interaction partner's subsequent choice. Here we investigated the neural
correlates of spontaneous socially mindful and unmindful behaviours. Functional magnetic resonance data were
acquired from 47 healthy adolescents and young adults (age 16–27) as they completed the SoMi task. Being
faced with socially relevant choices was associated with activity in the medial prefrontal cortex, anterior cin-
gulate, caudate, and insula, which is consistent with prior neuroeconomical research. Importantly, socially
mindful choices were associated with activity in the right parietal cortex and the caudate, whereas unmindful
choices were associated with activity in the left prefrontal cortex. These neural ﬁndings were consistent with the
behavioural preference for mindful choices, suggesting that socially mindful decisions are the basic inclination,
whereas socially unmindful responses may require greater eﬀort and control. Together, these results begin to
uncover the neural correlates of socially mindful and unmindful choices, and illuminate the psychological
processes involved in cooperative social behaviour.
1. Introduction
Social mindfulness is being thoughtful of others in the present mo-
ment, and considering their needs and wishes before making a decision.
Recent research deﬁned this novel construct as “making other-re-
garding choices involving both skill and will to act mindfully toward
other people's control over outcomes” (Van Doesum et al., 2013, p. 86).
Such choices are often made swiftly with little deliberation, and occur
frequently in daily situations. Social mindfulness is focused on small
stakes, such as acts of kindness or politeness, which may often serve
social-communicative functions such as conveying interpersonal liking,
closeness, or respect (Van Lange and Van Doesum, 2015). For example,
imagine a father and his son having breakfast in a restaurant. As it
happens, there are only three individual cups of strawberry and one cup
of blackberry marmalade left to put on their toast. If the father decided
to choose the unique item (i.e., the blackberry marmalade), he would
literally remove the possibility of choice for his son; the latter can only
have strawberry. This can be seen as socially unmindful. Choosing one
of the non-unique items (strawberry), however, would be socially
mindful, because it leaves the other more control over the outcome. In
this case, the son would still be able to choose between two distinct
options rather than just take or leave the single option. The opportunity
to choose freely among many options is highly valued in our society
(Aoki et al., 2014).
This example illustrates two important features by which the op-
erationalisation of social mindfulness in the social mindfulness para-
digm extends altruism and the traditional neuroeconomic games in
research on cooperation (Camerer, 2003; Parks et al., 2013). First, so-
cial mindfulness captures the kind of low-cost (or “small stakes”) co-
operation that is so abundant in daily life: The son does not beneﬁt
greatly, nor does the father sacriﬁce much. Yet, the outcome of the
situation determines important aspects of the interpersonal relation-
ship. Despite its central role in everyday social life, such low-cost/small
beneﬁt cooperation has received relatively little attention (Van Lange
and Van Doesum, 2015). The focus on low-cost cooperation is a useful
complement to experimental research on economic games, which are
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designed to capture cooperation, often characterised by (substantial)
losses and gains. The outcome diﬀerences in the social mindfulness
paradigm are represented by minor diﬀerences in shape or colour of
objects to choose from, but less so in acts that are associated with large
losses or gains. Neither substantial amounts of money nor giving up
important resources play a central role in this paradigm. As examined in
the present research, social mindfulness involves choosing a redundant
object so that the other person retains choice (i.e., opting for the unique
marmalade would remove that choice for the other person). In-
vestigating the neural correlates of socially mindful and unmindful
behaviour may shed light onto which processes might underlie these
forms of low-cost cooperation, thereby complementing the existing
neuroeconomics and cooperation literature.
Second, social mindfulness targets a “social mind” that recognises
the needs and wishes of others before deciding on one's actions. Social
mindfulness is thought to be possible only when people are able to
recognise that their choices aﬀect the options for the other player, and
have the will to act accordingly. In altruism and traditional economic
games it is usually clear from the start that one's own choice impacts the
other's outcomes; this is oftentimes mentioned explicitly in the in-
structions (Kahneman et al., 1986; Van Lange et al., 1997). However, in
daily situations that is not always the case. The social mindfulness
paradigm confronts participants with a situation in which choices need
to be made, but without speciﬁc instructions regarding the outcomes of
the other player in the task. This is left to the participants themselves
(for details, see Methods, Section 2.2.1). Socially mindful behaviour
thus requires a person to independently “see” that their decisions have
consequences for others, which is a step beyond traditional approaches
to cooperation.
To our knowledge, there is no research on the neuroscience of low-
cost cooperation. Based on the existing literature on altruism and
neuroeconomics using other paradigms (i.e., trust game, prisoners di-
lemma, and ultimatum game), where the goal and risks are usually
clear, we investigated whether neural activity during the SoMi task is
similar to these social decision making paradigms. As alluded to earlier,
it is the combination of the absence of high risk, high cost, and large
economic gain, reﬂecting every day choices and interactions, that in-
spired this new line of research. Our general hypothesis states that
consistent forms of social mindfulness and unmindfulness activate
neural areas that are also implicated in deliberate forms of social de-
cision making, including the dorso-lateral and medial prefrontal cortex
(dlPFC and mPFC: (Amodio and Frith, 2006; Badre and Wagner, 2004;
Mitchell et al., 2009; Ridderinkhof et al., 2004; Van Overwalle, 2009)).
Furthermore, considering the needs and wishes of others is thought to
involve mentalising, perspective-taking, and empathy, reﬂecting the
skill. The neural mechanisms of perspective-taking and empathy have
been extensively studied (Decety, 2011; Gallagher and Frith, 2003;
Schurz et al., 2014; Shamay-Tsoory, 2011), but it is the combination of
both seeing another's (subtle) preference, and acting upon it in other-
regarding manner, that is essential to social mindfulness. Brain areas
such as the anterior cingulate (ACC), mPFC, temporo-parietal junction
(TPJ) and insula are involved in these processes (Blakemore, 2008;
Contreras et al., 2013; Saxe and Wexler, 2005; Zhu et al., 2007). Lastly,
we hypothesise that aﬀect is a key aspect of social mindfulness, in-
cluding sensations of reward. Based on this reasoning, we also expect to
ﬁnd activation of the ventral striatum, caudate, and insula (Delgado,
2007; Duerden et al., 2013; Hackel et al., 2015; Knutson and Cooper,
2005; Menon and Uddin, 2010; Rilling and Sanfey, 2011). It is plausible
that doing good, being considerate of the other person, brings about a
sense of reward (Higgins and Scholer, 2009), but perhaps choosing the
unique and therefore more valuable item (Brock, 1968; Lynn, 1991)
might be rewarding too (Higgins and Scholer, 2009). In another study
using this paradigm, social mindfulness was investigated between
friends and foes (Van Doesum et al., 2016), showing that taking away
the choice for the other might be rewarding under certain circum-
stances (with foes). Therefore, we also examined diﬀerences between
socially mindful or unmindful choices, and investigated which choices
could be considered the basic inclination. In addition, mirroring the
conceptualisation of social mindfulness (Mischkowski et al., 2017; Van
Doesum et al., 2017, 2013; Van Lange and Van Doesum, 2015), asso-
ciations of brain activity and measures of prosociality (the will) and the
Reading the Mind in the Eyes Task (the skill) (Baron‐Cohen et al., 2001)
were investigated to strengthen our inferences regarding underlying
mechanisms.
2. Methods
2.1. Participants
Fifty-three healthy adolescents and young adults, aged 16–27, were
recruited at schools and universities in the wider Amsterdam area (The
Netherlands). Inclusion criteria were age between 16 and 31 and suf-
ﬁcient command of the Dutch language. Exclusion criteria were a fa-
mily history of psychiatric disorders, autism spectrum disorders, an
IQ<80 (approximately) and any contraindications for MRI scanning.
All participants provided written informed consent. Six participants
were excluded from analyses due to invalid data, leaving us with a
sample of 47 subjects (22 female, Mage = 21.13, SD = 2.69). This re-
search was approved by the Ethical Committee of the VU Medical
Center Amsterdam.
2.2. Measures
2.2.1. Social Mindfulness Paradigm (SoMi task)
The SoMi task requires that the participant and a (ﬁctitious) second
person each choose one item from a set of four among which one is
unique and the rest identical (e.g., three green apples and one red
apple, see Fig. 1) (Van Doesum et al., 2017). The paradigm has been
Fig. 1. Example trials of the social mindfulness task
(SoMi), displaying (a) an experimental trial (3:1 ratio
presentation) and (b) a control trial (2:2 ratio pre-
sentation). The stimulus was displayed for 5000 ms,
followed by an inter-stimulus interval (0, 1000, or
2000 ms).Taken with permission from ms). Van
Doesum et al. (2016).
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well validated (Van Doesum et al., 2013), and social mindfulness has
already exhibited reliable associations with self-reports of empathy,
perspective-taking, honesty, and prosocial orientation (Mischkowski
et al., 2017; Van Doesum et al., 2013, 2016). Participants were in-
structed that they would always choose ﬁrst, and that chosen items
would not be replaced. Choosing an identical item, and thereby leaving
the second person a choice, was labeled socially mindful; taking away
the unique item, and thus limiting this other person's choice, was la-
beled socially unmindful. We introduced control trials as a baseline
measure for fMRI analyses, displaying the items in a 2:2 ratio (e.g., two
blue and two yellow base-ball caps), in which the participant's choices
would have no social consequences.
Using a within-participants design, the SoMi task was administered
twice. In the ﬁrst round (spontaneous condition), participants only re-
ceived the above-mentioned general information. In the second round
(instructed condition), participants received the instruction to “keep the
best interest of the other person in mind” (cf. Van Doesum et al., 2013).
Note that the instructions we used provided directional information
only: Participants were not explicitly asked to behave in a socially
mindful manner. Instruction was included for replication of previous
behavioural studies (Studies 1a-1c, Van Doesum et al., 2013), and to
examine whether results of the current sample were similar to previous
samples. In the fMRI analyses, however, only spontaneous choices were
used, because spontaneous (un)mindful choices were our main interest,
and all participants chose predominantly mindfully after instruction,
making the unmindful sample too small for reliable analyses.
Each round consisted of 60 trials, including 24 experimental trials,
presenting one unique versus three identical items and 24 control trials,
oﬀering two pairs of identical items. Experimental and control trials
were presented in a quasi-randomised order that was identical for all
participants. The stimulus was presented for 5000 ms. During this
period participants had to make a choice, which was immediately made
visible to the participant. After 5000 ms an inter-stimulus interval
(blank screen) followed, randomly jittered between 0, 1000, and
2000 ms. Additionally, 12 null events were randomly inserted with a
duration of 5000 ms, where participants passively watched a blank
screen. Mindful answers were equally distributed over the four answer
options, using the index and middle ﬁngers of both hands.
In addition to providing a context to examine socially mindful and
unmindful decisions, task behaviour yielded an index of participants’
degree of social mindfulness. This SoMi index was computed as the
proportion of socially mindful decisions, varying from 0 (only socially
unmindful choices) to 1 (only socially mindful choices). For beha-
vioural analyses, the number of choices made (mindful and unmindful)
and reaction times (stimulus onset to participant's choice) were ex-
amined.
2.2.2. Social Value Orientation (SVO)
Social value orientation is thought to reﬂect the will to act in a so-
cially mindful manner and is used as potential moderator for socially
mindful behaviour. We measured SVO with the well-validated nine-
item Triple Dominance Measure (Haruno and Frith, 2010; Van Lange
et al., 1997). Participants were asked to allocate valuable points
(money) between themselves and an unknown other. They could
choose for a division (a) of equal amounts (e.g., 520–520), (b) with
greatest gain for themselves (e.g., 580–320), or (c) with maximum
diﬀerence between self and other (e.g., 520–120). Participants were
classiﬁed as having (a) a prosocial orientation, preferring equality in
outcomes; (b) an individualistic, or (c) a competitive orientation, en-
hancing absolute or relative advantage for the self, respectively, only if
they made six or more choices within one category. With less than six
answers within one category, the participant was considered un-
classiﬁable (Van Lange et al., 1997) and was excluded from analyses
involving SVO (n = 5). Because we found relatively few participants
with individualistic (n= 9) and competitive (n= 3) orientations in our
sample, we collapsed these two categories into a proself (n = 12)
orientation, to be contrasted with the prosocial (n = 30) orientation,
treating SVO as a dichotomous variable, see also (De Cremer and Van
Lange, 2001; Van Kleef and Van Lange, 2008).
2.2.3. Reading the Mind in the Eyes Task (Eyes task – adult version)
The ability to understand the mental states of other persons is
thought to be involved in social decision making (the skill needed to act
in a socially mindful way). The Eyes task is a 28-item questionnaire
used to test an aspect of Theory of Mind ability (Baron‐Cohen et al.,
2001; Vellante et al., 2013). On each trial, a pair of eyes was presented
on the computer screen, and four emotional expressions were presented
below it. Participants were instructed to choose the emotional expres-
sion that best ﬁtted with the pair of eyes shown. This task involves
inferring mental states of an individual from information based on a
picture of their eyes. The proportion of correct answers was calculated.
Reaction times were not recorded and no time limit was imposed.
2.3. Procedure
After signing the consent form, participants completed several pen
and paper questionnaires - unrelated to this topic - followed by the Eyes
task and the SVO assessment on a computer. Subsequently participants
were scanned for 55 min. The scanning session started with a trust
game, with no ﬁnal gain displayed at the end (Lemmers-Jansen et al.,
2017). To limit possible transfer-eﬀects to the second paradigm, the
trust game was followed by the structural scan, during which partici-
pants could relax for 6 min closing their eyes or watching a movie.
Thereafter, participants completed the SoMi task, lasting approximately
15 min. Instructions were provided in the scanner, immediately prior to
the task. Four practice trials were completed to ensure understanding of
the task. Instructions for the second round were given visually and
orally while scanning was paused. After scanning, participants received
an image of their structural brain scan, €25 for participation, and travel
expenses.
2.4. fMRI data acquisition
fMRI data were obtained at the Spinoza Center Amsterdam, using a
3.0T Philips Achieva whole body scanner (Philips Healthcare, Best, The
Netherlands) equipped with a 32 channel head coil. A T2* EPI sequence
(TR = 2, TE = 27.63, FA = 76.1°, FOV 240 mm, voxel size 3 × 3 × 3,
37 slices, .3 mm gap) was used, resulting in 185 images per condition. A
T1-weighed anatomical scan was acquired for anatomical reference (TR
= 8.2, TE = 3.8, FA = 8⁰, FOV 240*188 mm, voxel size 1 × 1 × 1,
220 slices).
2.5. Data analysis
2.5.1. Behavioural data
Demographic and behavioural data were analysed using Statistical
Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS, 2012). Paired samples t-tests
were used to analyse the frequency of choices participants made and
diﬀerences in reaction times (RT) between conditions. Pearson corre-
lation was used to test the association between RT, choice patterns, and
Eyes task. For the associations between RT and choice patterns, and the
dichotomous variable SVO, a point-biserial correlation was used.
2.5.2. Imaging data
Imaging data were analysed using Statistical Parametric Mapping 8
(SPM, 2009). Functional images for each participant were preprocessed
with the following steps: realign and unwarp, coregistration with in-
dividual structural images, segmented for normalisation to an MNI
template and smoothing with a 6 mm full width at half maximum
(FWHM) Gaussian kernel. At ﬁrst-level, a general linear model (GLM)
was used to construct individual time courses for the onset of trial
presentations and individual reaction times for the spontaneous and
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instructed conditions. The interval between stimulus onset and choice
time represented the decision period, which was modelled with a delta
function modulated by the actual reaction times. The combination of
mean reaction times around 2000 ms (with small variations) and the
inter-stimulus interval (0, 1000, 2000 ms) ensured enough time
(3000–5000 ms) to distinguish between subsequent trials (Friston et al.,
1999). Experimental trials were contrasted with the control trials (2:2
ratio), the baseline measure. In the experimental trials (3:1 ratio), a
distinction was made between socially mindful and unmindful re-
sponses. At second level, a one-sample t-test was used for the main
eﬀects, followed by conjunction analyses, to determine overlap in ac-
tivation between mindful and unmindful choices, and exclusion ana-
lyses to identify choice speciﬁc neural activation. All analyses were
controlled for age and gender eﬀects.
To ensure reliable neural analyses of responses in the experimental
trials, for fMRI analysis participants were only included in the analysis
of a condition if they had at least 1/3 of the 24 responses within that
condition. Participants with 1–7 unmindful responses were included
only in the mindful condition, with 8–16 unmindful choices were in-
cluded in both mindful and unmindful conditions, and with 17–24 only
in the unmindful condition. This resulted in varying sample size per
analysis. In the analysis where participants were presented with an
experimental trial per se (3:1 ratio presentation, i.e., making a social
choice), all responses of all participants were included.
A whole brain analysis was performed to identify general patterns of
task activation. First, we looked at the general condition of being pre-
sented with an experimental trial (social choice), regardless of outcome
(spontaneous mindful and unmindful answers> control trials). Then
spontaneous mindful choices> control trials and unmindful
choices> control trials were analysed separately. All main eﬀects were
calculated at a signiﬁcance level of α = .05 whole brain family-wise
error (FWE) corrected. Conjunction and exclusion analyses were also
conducted at a signiﬁcance level of α= .05 whole brain FWE corrected.
For these analyses, one condition (e.g. mindful choices> control) was
selected, and a contrast calculated with the other condition (e.g. un-
mindful> control) with a mask p-value of .05. The mask was inclusive
for conjunction analyses, showing regions that were activated in both
conditions, and exclusive for exclusion analyses, showing condition
speciﬁc activation. For the whole brain FWE corrected analyses no
additional cluster size threshold was used.
Second, exploratory conjunction and exclusion analyses were per-
formed with SoMi index and Eyes task as covariates. These behavioural
measures were added to identify mechanisms underlying this paradigm.
Procedure was similar to the above mentioned conjunction and exclu-
sion analyses, however, these analyses were performed with a more
lenient threshold of p= .001 uncorrected, using a cluster size threshold
of k = 10.
3. Results
3.1. Behavioural results
Participant characteristics are displayed in Table 1. Analysing the
choice pattern of the 47 participants in the SoMi task, the number and
proportion of mindful and unmindful responses were calculated (see
Table 2). Paired samples t-tests showed that, in the spontaneous con-
dition, participants made signiﬁcantly more mindful than unmindful
choices overall, t(46) = 2.73, d = .4, p = .009 (M proportion mindful,
unmindful = .56, .44). These proportions diﬀered signiﬁcantly from
chance, t(46) = 2.56, d = .4, p = .014. As expected, participants were
more likely to make mindful choices in the instructed condition t(46) =
8.78, d = 1.3, p< .001 (M proportion spontaneous, instructed: .56,
.86), conﬁrming that the instruction had the intended eﬀect. Males and
females did not diﬀer signiﬁcantly in age, SVO nor in the number of
spontaneous mindful choices.
Reaction times (RT) for spontaneously mindful and unmindful
choices were not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent (p = .51; for means, see
Table 2). A paired samples t-test showed a signiﬁcant decrease of re-
action times for mindful choices after instruction, t(46) = 7.94,
p< .001. After instruction, RT for unmindful choices remained un-
changed.
The mean proportion of correct answers for the 47 subjects on the
Eyes task was .69 (SD = .10) and the distribution of the SVOs was
comparable to previous research, with more prosocial (n = 30) than
proself oriented participants (n = 12; 5 participants were not cate-
gorisable due to inconsistent decisions) (Van Lange et al., 1997; Van
Doesum et al., 2013).
3.2. Associations
Correlation and point-biserial correlation analyses were performed
to investigate the association of Eyes task and SVO (believed to re-
present the skill and will underlying SoMi) with the SoMi task outcomes.
As expected, SVO was associated with the proportion of spontaneous
mindful choices: Prosocial individuals made more mindful choices (M
= .59), and proselfs made more unmindful choices (M = .48, F [1,40]
= 5.09, p = .030). This pattern validated our interpretation of task
responses as indicating mindful and unmindful responses, respectively.
Eyes task outcome was not signiﬁcantly associated with the proportion
spontaneous mindful choices (p = .62), nor with reaction times (all
ps> .47).
Associations of RT with the Eyes task and SVO were not signiﬁcant
(all ps> .33) and no diﬀerences within SVO group between RT for
mindful and unmindful choices were found. Having a proself orienta-
tion did not result in faster unmindful decisions.
3.3. fMRI results
3.3.1. Whole brain results
All main eﬀects were calculated with an FWE corrected signiﬁcance
level of p = .05. Experimental trials were contrasted with the control
trials. After initial analyses, one participant was classiﬁed as an outlier
on the basis of the β-values exceeding 3 SDs from the mean. This
Table 1
Participant characteristics.
Participants, N 47
Age, mean (SD), range 21.13 (2.69), 16.2–27.4
Gender, male N (%) 25 (53%)
Handedness, right handed N (%) 38 (81%)
SVO, prosocial / proself / no category N (%) 30 (64%) / 12 (25%) / 5 (11%)
Eyes task, proportion correct answers (SD) .69 (.1)
Note: SVO = Social Value Orientation; Eyes task = Reading the Mind in the Eyes task.
Table 2
Behavioural outcomes of the social mindfulness task.
Number of Recorded Choices per Condition Spontaneous Instructed
n (SD) n (SD)
Mindful 13.36 (3.64) 20.74 (4.36)
– proportion .56 (.15) .86 (.18)
Unmindful 10.47 (3.64) 3.26 (4.36)
– proportion .44 (.15) .13 (.18)
Mean Reaction Times per Condition in
Milliseconds
M (SD) M (SD)
Mindful 1975.17 (422.50) 1583.43 (325.22)
Unmindful 2009.97 (434.54) 1870.43 (677.69)
Note: Number of choices made between conditions (spontaneous and instructed) and
between choices within condition (mindful and unmindful), all diﬀerences were sig-
niﬁcant at α = .001. RT in the instructed mindful condition diﬀered signiﬁcantly from
spontaneous mindful choices (α = .001) and from instructed unmindful choices (α =
.05).
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participant was removed from all fMRI analyses, resulting in a sample
of N = 46. Presentation of an experimental trial, a choice with social
consequences (experimental trial> control trial; N = 46), was asso-
ciated with robust medial prefrontal and parietal activity, together with
posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) and precuneus activity (see
Supplementary Table 1). The main eﬀect of making spontaneously
mindful choices (mindful> control; n = 43) elicited bilateral activa-
tion in frontal, temporal, and parietal areas, including the middle and
posterior cingulum (see Fig. 2a and Supplementary Table 2). Making
spontaneously unmindful choices (unmindful> control; n = 37) was
associated with activation in bilateral prefrontal and parietal areas, as
well as the ACC, PCC and insula (see Fig. 2b and Supplementary
Table 3).
The overlap between mindful and unmindful choices and choice
speciﬁc activation were tested to examine general patterns of activity
for the SoMi task and activation unique to each response. Conjunction
analysis showed bilateral TPJ and midline (pre)frontal activation (see
Fig. 2c and Table 3). Speciﬁc activation for mindful choices
(mindful> control excluding unmindful> control) was found in the
right hemisphere, in frontal and parietal areas, including TPJ (see
Fig. 2d and Table 4). The analysis of the reverse contrast (un-
mindful> control excluding mindful> control) revealed activation in
the left hemisphere, mainly frontal, in the mPFC, ACC and superior
frontal gyrus, as well as temporal regions and PCC (see Fig. 2e and
Table 4). Lateralisation shows clearly in Table 4, but is less clear in
Fig. 2d and e, due to a more lenient threshold.
3.3.2. Associations between neural activity, SoMi index, and Eyes task
Exploratory exclusion and conjunction analyses were performed
with SoMi index and Eyes task to investigate their associations with
neural activity. Only in the mindful choices> control excluding un-
mindful> control associations were found (see Table 5). SoMi index
was uniquely associated with activation of the caudate, temporal
middle gyrus, postcentral gyrus, and the cerebellum. Eyes task showed
an association with dlPFC activation. Associations of the SoMi index
with caudate activity and Eyes task with dlPFC are displayed in Fig. 3.
The reverse analysis (unmindful> control excluding mindful>
control) and the conjunction analysis did not reveal signiﬁcant asso-
ciations with SoMi index nor Eyes task.
Fig. 2. Whole brain results for a) spontaneous socially mindful choices> control trials (n = 43), and b) spontaneous socially unmindful choices> control trials (n = 37), and c) the
conjunction analysis, followed by d) exclusion analyses mindful choices> control trials excluding unmindful choices> control trials, and e) unmindful choices> control trials excluding
mindful choices> control trials. For the images results were displayed with an uncorrected p = .001, with a cluster size threshold of k = 50.
Table 3
Conjunction between spontaneous mindful and unmindful choices.
Overlap
Mindful and
Unmindful
Hemisphere MNI coordinates Cluster size p z
x y z
mPFC R 3 41 40 26 .001 5.54
ACC R 3 50 34 5.08
mPFC L −6 41 46 3 .006 5.04
mPFC R 0 35 46 1 .017 4.76
Superior
frontal
gyrus
R 15 44 46 2 .009 4.73
TPJ L −51 −58 37 39 < .001 5.57
L −51 −58 28 4.93
TPJ R 57 −61 34 4 .003 4.85
TPJ R 48 −58 31 1 .017 4.86
Note: Conjunction analyses were performed with a p = .05, whole brain FWE corrected,
with a contrast mask p-value of .05, and no additional cluster size threshold. Results show
brain areas that are activated in both mindful> control and unmindful> control con-
ditions. TPJ = temporo-parietal junction; mPFC = medial prefrontal cortex; ACC =
anterior cingulate cortex; R = right; L = left.
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4. Discussion
The purpose of the present research was to examine the neural
substrates of socially mindful and unmindful behaviour, a phenomenon
in social decision making that is gaining more and more attention. By
unraveling the underlying neural networks of social mindfulness, we
aimed to verify social psychological theories of social mindfulness,
conceptualised in terms of skill and will to act in an other-regarding
manner. The social mindfulness task involves a series of choices for
objects, that may have implications for the options that are left for the
next person. This SoMi task is increasingly used in behavioural ex-
periments, and allowed us to examine low-cost cooperation in a nat-
uralistic context. In this task people typically need “to see” the social
(un)mindfulness of the options to act upon it in a purposeful manner.
Three main ﬁndings of the present research can be highlighted: (1)
Socially relevant decisions in the SoMi task, compared with responses
that did not have implications for social mindfulness, involve medial
prefrontal and (medial) parietal activity, resembling activation in other
neuroeconomic games; (2) spontaneously, participants made more
often mindful than unmindful choices, and socially mindful and un-
mindful decisions activated diﬀerent areas and networks, suggesting
distinct underlying mechanisms; and (3) results were partly moderated
by SoMi index, the mindful behaviour.
As we discuss below in Section 4.3, these ﬁndings are consistent
with the view that socially mindful choices activate a more automatic
network (Lieberman, 2007; Sanfey and Chang, 2008; Spitzer et al.,
2007), suggesting that participants were generally more automatically
inclined to make mindful choices. Inferring processes from observed
neural activation is speculative (Poldrack, 2006; Poldrack et al., 2016).
However, we link the present ﬁndings to previous research and
Table 4
Condition speciﬁc results for the mindful and unmindful choices.
Hemisphere MNI coordinates Cluster size p z
x y z
Mindful
Superior frontal gyrus R 21 20 58 5 .002 5.31
Inferior parietal gyrus R 51 −43 49 62 < .001 5.86
TPJ R 42 −49 46 5.39
TPJ R 60 −49 31 8 .001 5.02
Inferior parietal gyrus L −36 −49 43 8 .001 5.06
Inferior parietal gyrus L −48 −43 43 2 .009 4.84
Temporal middle gyrus R 57 −58 13 1 .017 5.01
Precuneus L −9 −70 37 3 .006 4.94
Cuneus R 9 −70 37 27 < .001 5.23
Unmindful
Superior frontal gyrus L −15 53 34 23 < .001 6.27
mPFC L −9 59 31 5.85
mPFC L −3 62 16 23 < .001 5.53
ACC L −6 47 13 19 < .001 5.62
L −9 47 4 5.09
ACC L −3 41 19 1 .017 4.85
ACC R 0 53 1 1 .017 4.76
Superior frontal gyrus L −15 35 46 5 .002 5.00
PCC L −3 −37 31 6 .001 5.50
PCC L −3 −49 25 4 .003 4.91
Temporal middle gyrus L −54 −16 −11 4 .003 5.35
Temporal middle gyrus L −51 −37 −2 5 .002 4.99
Temporal middle gyrus L −63 −19 −8 1 .017 5.06
Note: Exclusion analyses were performed with a p = .05, whole brain FWE corrected, with a contrast mask p-value of .05, and no additional cluster size threshold, showing condition
speciﬁc activation for the mindful> control excluding activation in the unmindful> control condition, and the reverse, unmindful> control excluding activation in the mindful>
control condition. TPJ = temporo-parietal junction; mPFC = medial prefrontal cortex; ACC = anterior cingulate cortex; PCC = posterior cingulate cortex; R = right; L = left.
Table 5
Associations of SoMi Index and Eyes task with brain activation.
Condition Covariate Hemisphere MNI coordinates Cluster size z
x y z
Mindful SoMi index
Caudate L −18 20 1 14 3.88
−15 14 7 3.56
Temporal middle gyrus R 54 −58 7 16 3.84
Postcentral gyrus L −39 −13 34 27 3.69
−39 −22 34 3.30
Cerebellum L −24 −67 −29 10 3.60
Cerebellum R 15 −61 −17 13 3.53
15 −61 −26 3.33
Mindful Eyes task
dlPFC R 48 20 4 14 3.83
45 26 −2 3.79
Note: Exploratory analyses were performed to investigate associations with the covariates SoMi index and Eyes task. Exclusion analyses were performed with a p = .001 uncorrected,
using a contrast mask p-value of .05, and a cluster size threshold of k = 10, showing condition speciﬁc activation for the mindful> control excluding activation in the unmindful>
control condition, for SoMi index and Eyes task. SoMi index = proportion socially mindful choices; Eyes task = Reading the Mind in the Eyes task; dlPFC = dorso-lateral prefrontal
cortex; R = right; L = left.
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behavioural data, which implicated similar regions and networks in
social decision making tasks (Tabibnia and Lieberman, 2007). The
present neural ﬁndings add to the behavioural ﬁndings by contributing
to a theoretical framework for social mindfulness and complementing
the literature on low-cost cooperation.
4.1. Socially relevant decisions
The ﬁrst observation is that making social decisions in the SoMi task
relates to medial prefrontal and (medial) parietal activity, activating a
wide range of social brain areas reported in studies using other neu-
roeconomic paradigms, including mPFC, ACC, TPJ, caudate, precuneus,
and insula (Bellucci et al., 2016; Güroğlu et al., 2010; King-Casas et al.,
2005; Lemmers-Jansen et al., 2017; Sanfey et al., 2003; Spitzer et al.,
2007; Tabibnia and Lieberman, 2007; van den Bos et al., 2009). The
present ﬁndings show that the mere presence of even low-cost forms of
cooperation can activate social decision making and mentalising areas.
Speciﬁcally, merely facing a conﬂict between a socially mindful and a
socially unmindful option seems to activate brain areas that are con-
sistent with the concept of a social mind as captured by the construct of
social mindfulness (Van Lange and Van Doesum, 2015).
4.2. Comparing socially mindful and unmindful choices
At the behavioural level, participants spontaneously made more
socially mindful than unmindful choices, suggesting a preference to act
mindfully. This observation was, however, not supported by diﬀerences
in reaction times. The proportion of mindful choices and the classiﬁ-
cation of SVO (almost twice as much prosocials than proselfs) are in line
with a previous study, but proportionally the current sample made less
socially mindful choices (cf. Study 4, Van Doesum et al., 2013). We
should note, however, that the behavioural diﬀerences (56% mindful,
44% unmindful choices) do not yet allow us to draw any ﬁrm conclu-
sions about the general preferred mode of responding.
At the same time, personal preferences were apparent: In line with
previous research, an association of SVO and SoMi index was found,
indicating that prosocial individuals spontaneously made more socially
mindful choices than did proselfs (Van Doesum et al., 2013). Instruction
to be other-oriented increased socially mindful choices (cf. Studies 1a-
1c, Van Doesum et al., 2013), especially for participants who sponta-
neously made less mindful choices. This observation may be partly due
to a ceiling eﬀect, but it indicates that instruction also is eﬀective for
participants who were not automatically mindfully inclined: All parti-
cipants were able to display socially mindful behaviour when in-
structed. This ﬁnding suggests that spontaneous mindful choices were
based on intentions to behave prosocially. Underlying mechanisms that
are often associated with neuroeconomic paradigms such as risk taking
or inequity aversion, fairness and punishment are less applicable to this
paradigm. Furthermore, instruction made reaction times shorter for
socially mindful choices, but not signiﬁcantly for socially unmindful
choices. This pattern may suggest that socially mindful responses
became more automatic: Participants were following an instruction
instead of actively making decisions. Alternatively, being in a mindful
environment (after instruction), answering within the habitual response
shortened RT, resulting in faster, more automatic mindful responses.
Whole brain analysis revealed that neural activation when making
spontaneous mindful decisions resembled the frontoparietal network
(FPN). The FPN is engaged in various cognitive processes, such as
planning and cognitive control (Spreng et al., 2010), directing atten-
tion, and weighing behavioural choices (Seeley et al., 2007). With these
functions, the activation of the FPN would ﬁt in both mindful and un-
mindful decisions. However, an additional function during decision
making, integrating information from the external environment with
stored internal representations (Vincent et al., 2008) corresponds better
with the mindful condition. This function is in concordance with the
idea that when acting socially mindfully, one considers the options in
light of the consequences for the other. Exclusion analyses revealed
mindful speciﬁc activation predominantly in the right hemisphere and
in the parietal lobe. The activation of the TPJ in mindful choices ﬁts the
idea of more outward oriented mentalising processes (Frith and Frith,
2006), supporting the other-focused orientation in mindful decisions.
Making spontaneous socially unmindful choices showed an activa-
tion pattern similar to the default mode network. Interpreting the ac-
tivation in light of spontaneous internal cognition, self-referential
thoughts, and processing of self-promotion goals (Spreng et al., 2010),
we can speculate that making unmindful choices involves self-reﬂective
thought and judgments, including moral decisions (Buckner et al.,
2008; Greene et al., 2001). Exclusion analysis supports this idea,
showing predominantly frontal activation, only in the left hemisphere
(Amodio and Frith, 2006; Frith and Frith, 2006). Choosing the unique
item seems to be more deliberate and self-reﬂective than making so-
cially mindful decisions.
4.3. Associations with SVO, SoMi index and Eyes task
The third observation concerns the association of SVO, SoMi index,
and the Eyes task (the operationalised skill and will) with task outcome
and neural activation. A prosocial orientation was associated with more
spontaneous mindful choices. SVO has often been studied as a mod-
erator variable, for example showing that prosocials are more likely to
cooperate than proselfs, even if they themselves do not directly beneﬁt
by doing so, whereas proselfs only tend to show some cooperation when
there is a future in which they can beneﬁt from cooperation (Van Lange
et al., 2011). Focusing on regions associated with social decision
making, exploratory brain analyses showed that the proportion mindful
choices was associated with the activation of the caudate, a region in-
volved in goal-directed behaviour in order to obtain reward (Grahn
et al., 2008), reward processing (Rilling et al., 2002; Rilling and Sanfey,
2011), and even norm compliance (Spitzer et al., 2007). Its activation
and the association with the SoMi index may indicate that choosing the
socially mindful option brings about gratifying emotions, suggesting
that for those inclined to choose mindfully, this choice is rewarding.
Fig. 3. Associations between neural activity and behavioural measures are shown for a) the left caudate (coordinates:−18, 20, 1) showing associations with behavioural outcome of the
social mindfulness task (SoMi index), and b) the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC; coordinates: 48, 20, 4) with the proportion correct answers of the Reading the Mind in the
Eyes task (Eyes task).
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Moreover, the better participants were at performing the menta-
lising task, the more dlPFC activation during mindful choices was ob-
served. The dlPFC is implicated in ﬂexible decision making and resol-
ving conﬂict (Mitchell et al., 2009), cognitive control (Cieslik et al.,
2012), associated with fairness goals (Knoch et al., 2006), value pro-
cessing (Dixon and Christoﬀ, 2014; Hare et al., 2009), and manipula-
tion of verbal and spatial knowledge (Barbey et al., 2013). However,
the most plausible explanation in combination with higher mentalising
scores would be the implementation of fairness norms (Spitzer et al.,
2007), possibly in combination with overriding prepotent selﬁsh re-
sponses (Rilling and Sanfey, 2011). However, the latter explanation is
conﬂicting with our ﬁnding that making mindful choices seems to be
the automatic, therefore prepotent response. The better a participant is
in mentalising, the more the consequences for another person are
considered during mindful decision making. These analyses are, how-
ever, reported at a more lenient threshold of p= .001 uncorrected, and
should therefore be interpreted with caution.
The present ﬁndings suggest that distinct networks play a role
during mindful and unmindful choices, and add neuroscientiﬁc evi-
dence in support of a motivational diﬀerence. We suggest that people
with a prosocial orientation are more likely to automatically act in a
socially mindful manner, and that mindful choices may well be the
result of relatively automatic, rewarding, and less controlled decision
making (Rand et al., 2012; Rand and Nowak, 2013; Sanfey and Chang,
2008). In contrast, people with a proself orientation may closely eval-
uate the strategic advantages of social mindfulness (Van Lange et al.,
2011), possibly reﬂected by increased prefrontal activation, suggesting
a more eﬀortful process. These ﬁndings suggest new predictions that
could be tested more directly in future research.
5. Limitations and future directions
The present study provides an initial investigation of the neural
underpinnings of socially mindful and unmindful behaviour. Although
our results provided important new contributions to our understanding
of social mindfulness in the context of social decision making, it is
important to consider some of the limitations and boundary conditions
in this work. The ﬁrst limitation is that we did not include qualitative
data on subjects’ motivations for decision making. As discussed in
Section 4.3, motivations for social interactions diﬀer between proso-
cially and proself oriented participants. We can only hypothesise the
diﬀerence in motivation on the basis of the neural results, suggesting
diﬀerent underlying mechanisms. If participants are indeed conscious
of their motivations, such data (additional questionnaire after admin-
istering the SoMi task) would be a valuable addition to future SoMi
research. A distinction with norm compliance and other educationally
imposed behaviours could then be made. Secondly, participants were
scanned for about an hour, which could have caused fatigue. However,
it has been shown that cognitive load and time pressure do not aﬀect
socially mindful behaviour (Mischkowski et al., 2017), but may have
aﬀected neural outcomes. In addition, the lateralised speciﬁc brain
activity for mindful and unmindful choices might have been inﬂuenced
by the inclusion of left handed participants (Willems et al., 2014).
Furthermore, we were not able to establish a direct relation with
mentalising abilities as assessed with the Eyes task. Like much past
fMRI work, our conclusions about mentalising were based on reverse
inference (Amodio, 2010; Poldrack, 2006; Poldrack et al., 2016). Per-
forming both SoMi and mentalising tasks in the scanner, and including
reaction times for the mentalising task could reveal valuable, direct
information about this relation. Possibly with another task (e.g., the
director task (Dumontheil et al., 2010); or the hinting task (Corcoran
et al., 1995)), investigating other aspects of mentalising and perspective
taking, links between SoMi and mentalising could be speciﬁed and the
diﬀerentiation of the mentalising network further explored. A broader
age range would also add to the present knowledge by yielding in-
formation about the window of development of SoMi, hypothesising
that after a period of development, increases in social mindfulness
would level oﬀ (Crone and Güroglu, 2013). Girls have been found to be
more prosocial than boys, with a preference for empathy rather than
competition (Derks et al., 2015). Gender diﬀerences might also play a
role in the SoMi task, hypothesising more spontaneous mindful choices
in females than in males. To further increase similarities with existing
paradigms, making the SoMi task really interactive, in the sense that
choice feedback is given or participant acting as second chooser, would
add to the concept of social mindfulness, both when given and received.
And lastly, administering the SoMi task to patient groups that suﬀer
from social deﬁcits (e.g., autism spectrum disorder and psychosis) could
shed light on the importance of mentalising and basic prosocial or-
ientation on social interactions. It may well be the recognition of
“subtle consequences for others” that is easy to learn (instruct) but often
overlooked in theory and research on human cooperation
5.1. Concluding remarks
The present study helps to substantiate the novel construct of social
mindfulness by investigating its neural underpinnings. Social mind-
fulness involves relatively subtle consequences for others with sub-
stantial impact on the interpersonal relationship. In the context of the
growing research on social mindfulness in various social domains like
aggression (Van Doesum et al., 2016), perceived customer mistreatment
(Song et al., 2017), or the inﬂuence of social class on prosocial beha-
viour (Van Doesum et al., 2017), we hope that the current ﬁndings will
provide a neuroscientiﬁc base for future research to build on. In social
cooperation, costs do not have to be high for prosocial decisions to be
eﬀective on an interpersonal level; as long as they are seen.
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